Approval Runoff Strategy Comparison Tool

Explore strategic voting in runoff approval systems using constructions from Fishburn & Brams (1981) "Approval Voting, Condorcet's Principle, and Runoff Elections"

What this tool does:

This tool demonstrates Theorem 2 from the paper: for non-dichotomous preferences, every strategy is admissible under runoff approval voting. That means for any two ballot strategies you choose, we can construct concrete election scenarios where each beats the other—neither dominates!

The constructions use specific vote totals and pairwise matchups (H1-H4 from the proof) to show how runoff mechanics create complex strategic incentives.

Note: Rather than getting caught up in the "this is so unrealistic all the scenarios have candidates winning by one vote!", one might instead interpret the votes as follows: What this tool shows is that when multiple candidates appear to be viable, it is mathematically proven that the addition of a runoff can add perverse strategic incentives depending on the perceived or predicted head-to-head matchups that would occur in the final top-two runoff.

Step 1: Define Your Preference

How to format your preference: Examples:

Note: With only 2 tiers (dichotomous preferences like A>B), certain strategies dominate and the interesting non-dominance results don't always apply. You need at least 3 distinct preference levels to see the theorem in action (as we have implemented it here).

Step 2: Select Two Strategies to Compare

Strategy S

Strategy T