Explore strategic voting in runoff approval systems using constructions from Fishburn & Brams (1981) "Approval Voting, Condorcet's Principle, and Runoff Elections"
This tool demonstrates Theorem 2 from the paper: for non-dichotomous preferences, every strategy is admissible under runoff approval voting. That means for any two ballot strategies you choose, we can construct concrete election scenarios where each beats the other—neither dominates!
The constructions use specific vote totals and pairwise matchups (H1-H4 from the proof) to show how runoff mechanics create complex strategic incentives.
> to show preference order (most preferred →
least preferred)> are optional but allowedPeltola>Begich>Palin — Alaska 2022 RCV electionA>B>C — simple abstract exampleAlice>Bob>Charlie>Diana — 4 candidates with namesCandidate 1 > Candidate 2 > Candidate 3 — spaces are fineNote: With only 2 tiers (dichotomous preferences like A>B), certain strategies dominate and the interesting non-dominance results don't always apply. You need at least 3 distinct preference levels to see the theorem in action (as we have implemented it here).